政策性扰动、大股东制衡与董事会独立性  

Policy-related Disturbance,Blockholders Counterbalance and Board Independence

作　　者：唐跃军[1] 左晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2010年第5期27-39,共13页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802015);上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题资助项目(2008EJB002);2008年教育部博士点新教师基金项目资助(200802461116)

摘　　要：注意到伴随《指导意见》和股权分置改革而来的政策性扰动对大股东制衡行为的影响,文章选择2000-2008年中国市场的经验证据,从第二类代理问题出发,细致刻画上市公司前五大股东间的制衡行为,并讨论前两大股东的勾结行为,研究大股东制衡机制对董事会独立性的重要作用。Taking account of the effects of policy-related disturbance caused by The Guidance of Independent Director Institution for Listed Companies and reform for ownership separation on blockholders counterbalance,the paper,from the perspective of typeⅡ agency problem,portrays the counterbalance behaviors of top 5 blockholders based on the evidence of Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2008.It discusses the collusion behaviors of top 2 blockholders and the significant effect of counterbalance mechanism on board...

关 键 词：大股东制衡 政策性扰动 董事会独立性 第二类代理问题 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]