控制权及投资者保护对掏空风险的影响——基于融资规模的经验证据  

Influence of Control Rights and Investor Protection on Risk of Tunneling——Based on the Empirical Evidence of Financing Scale

作　　者：黎来芳[1] 张伟华[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院 [2]北京工商大学商学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2011年第6期47-62,共16页Scientific Decision Making

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002097);教育部人文社科项目(09YJC630221)

摘　　要：基于中国上市公司融资规模数据对上市公司的控制权与掏空风险的关系进行了实证分析,并探讨了投资者保护对掏空风险的抑制作用。研究发现:与国家终极控制的上市公司相比,私人终极控制的上市公司中掏空风险更高,因而融资规模显著高于前者;控股股东持股比例越高,掏空上市公司的动机越小,从而导致上市公司融资规模越低;其他大股东的制衡能力越强,控股股东掏空上市公司的可能性越小,因而上市公司融资规模越低;投资者保护水平越高,越能起到抑制掏空风险的作用。Based on the financing scale data of Chinese listed companies,this article makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between control rights and risk of tunneling,and discusses the role of investor protection in reducing the risk of tunneling.This research discovers that:compared with the SOEs,the risk of tunneling is higher in private listed companies,and therefore the financing scale is notably higher than that in the former;the higher proportion of shares the controlling shareholder has,the smaller the motivation of tunneling is,resulting in the lower financing scale of listed companies;the counterbalance ability of other large shareholders is stronger,it is less possible for the controlling shareholder to tunnel the listed companies,thus the financing scale of listed companies is lower;investor protection plays an important role in reducing the risk of tunneling.

关 键 词：控制权 投资者保护 掏空风险 融资规模 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济]