对Cartel联盟机制的非合作博弈分析  

The Non-cooperative Game Analysis on the Mechanism of Cartel Alliance

作　　者：姚洪心[1] 李军[1] 武振业[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《预测》2004年第4期75-77,共3页Forecasting

摘　　要：Cartel联盟是当前企业合作的重要形式,它以限价和限量为手段追求行业收益,然后再根据公平的分配机制分享利润。本文在古诺模型的基础上进行了Cartel联盟模型的扩展,并且对其重复博弈机理进行了分析;本文的结论是在静态博弈条件下企业的Cartel联盟不具有稳定性条件,在重复博弈条件下,企业在合作均衡与竞争均衡之间的选择取决于贴现因子的大小。Cartel alliance is a important form of the cooperation between the companies, it run after the industry payoff with the method of limit price and limit quantity, thus share the revenue according to the fair distributing mechanism. The paper extend cartel alliance on the basis of the Cournot model,and analyze mechanism of repeated game of cartel alliance; the result of the paper is the cartel alliance has no stable promise in the condition of the static game,the choose between the cooperative equilibrium and competitive equilibrium is decided by the numbers of the discount rate.

关 键 词：Cartel联盟 古诺模型 重复博弈 贴现因子 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]