生产能力与工资合约的交互关系:基于文凭信号视角  

The Interaction between Productivity and Wage Contracts:Based on the Diploma Signals Perspective

作　　者：贺尊[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学文法与经济学院,湖北武汉430081

出　　处：《兰州商学院学报》2012年第6期22-27,共6页Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目"提高劳动力市场运行效率的研究:基于教育信号的视角"的研究成果

摘　　要：劳动力市场运行着按文凭信号制定工资等级差别的通则。文凭信号的分离均衡与混同均衡模型,较好地解释了生产能力与工资合约之间的交互关系。要解决劳动力市场人力资源配置效率低下的问题,须阻止文凭信号的模仿与复制行为,使信号发送成本与其生产能力形成负相关,只有这样文凭信号才能成为劳动力市场所需要设置的一种筛选工具,发挥信号传递与甄别的作用。The labor market is running the General Clauses of the wage level of difference press Diploma signal to develop.Diploma signals separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium model to explain the interaction between productivity and wage contracts.To solve the problem of low labor market,human resource allocation efficiency,to prevent the diploma imitation and copying the behavior of the signaling,the signaling costs are negatively correlated with productivity,so that the Diploma signals to the labor market needs to be set as a screening tool,the role of signaling and screening.

关 键 词：生产能力 工资合约 文凭信号 信号成本 劳动力市场 

分 类 号：F24[经济管理—劳动经济]