上市公司家族控制对代理成本影响的实证分析  

An Empirical Analysis on the Influence of Listed Firms of Family Governance to Agency Costs

作　　者：毕艳杰[1] 郜林平[2] 

机构地区：[1]河北经贸大学会计学院,河北石家庄050061 [2]河北经贸大学财务处,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报（综合版）》2012年第2期82-85,共4页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business(Comprehensive Edition)

基　　金：河北省社科基金资助项目(HB11YJ019)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：以沪深300家家族控股上市公司为研究样本,建立家族控制对代理成本影响的分析模型,实证分析结果表明:家族持股比例与代理成本呈显著的负相关关系;家族成员担任董事长或总经理有利于降低代理成本;家族董事对代理成本的影响不明显。By establishing the analytical model of family governance to agency costs based on a sample of 300 listed firms of family governance in Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchange.We find out that family ownership is negatively related to the agency costs,that family members as chairman or the general manager is beneficial to reduce agency cost;family director is not remarkable to the agency costs.

关 键 词：家族公司 家族控制 代理成本 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]