股权激励报酬契约与盈余质量的关系研究  

A Study on the Relationship of Executive Equity Incentives Contract and Earnings Quality

作　　者：毕晓方[1] 韩传模[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2012年第6期75-82,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872082);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(10JYC630006);天津财经大学预研发展基金项目(Y1005)

摘　　要：股权激励报酬契约和会计信息质量之间存在着密切的内在联系。盈余质量特征会影响管理者持股和股权激励报酬契约的选择,反之,管理者持股和股权激励方案的实施也会对盈余质量产生影响。研究发现:盈余质量可靠性和及时性较低的上市公司更倾向于授予管理者较多的股权;管理者持股对盈余及时性产生正向影响;上市公司实施股权激励后盈余可靠性质量明显降低。The implementation of executive equity incentive contract is closely related to the accounting information quality.Earnings quality has an effect on management shareholding and executive equity incentives plans,and management shareholding and equity incentives do the same on the earnings quality.The study finds some results as follows.First,firms with lower earnings quality may attract higher manager ownership.Second,there is a significant positive correlation between management equity and earnings timeliness.Third,after the company executive equity incentive plan,earnings reliability will be reduced accordingly.

关 键 词：股权激励 报酬契约 管理者持股 盈余质量 盈余质量可靠性 盈余及时性 会计盈余 

分 类 号：F235.19[经济管理—会计学]