内部控制质量与债权人保护研究——基于债务契约特征的视角  

Quality of Internal Control and Creditors' Protection:from the Perspective of the Characteristic of Debt Covenants

作　　者：李晓慧[1] 杨子萱[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2013年第2期97-105,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：中央财经大学"211工程"重点学科建设项目;北京市教育委员会共建项目

摘　　要：从债务契约特征的视角探讨内部控制对债权人的保护作用,并对比分析内部控制和公司治理在债权人保护方面的差异,通过研究发现:内部控制质量较高时,债权人会感知到更多的保护信号,并通过放宽债务契约条件表现出来,此时债权人会倾向持有更多的债务资本以及偏好更低的债务资本成本和更长的债务期限。另外,通过对比内部控制与公司治理在债权人保护方面的差异,发现在债权人保护方面,内部控制更具有增量作用。From the perspective of the characteristics of debt covenants,the paper investigates the protective effect of internal control for creditors and compares and analyses the differences between internal cantrol and corporate governance in the protection of creditors.The paper finds that facing the high quality of internal control,the creditors will perceive more protective signals and then express them by the relaxation of the conditions in the debt covenants,such as put more new debt capital,lower cost of debt capital and expand longer debt maturity.Compared with corporate governance,internal control has more incremental effect in creditors' protection,which provides a theoretical basis for the inspecting effectiveness of policies and enterprises to strengthen internal control system.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 公司治理 债权人保护 债务契约理论 债务资本 内部牵制 相关利益者保护 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]