董事声誉、繁忙董事会与信息披露质量  

Directors Reputation,Busy Boards and the Quality of Information Disclosure

作　　者：王建琼[1] 陆贤伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2013年第4期67-74,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金西部项目(11XGL001)

摘　　要：信息披露质量对缓解代理成本起着重要影响。以2007—2010年中国深圳证券交易所上市公司为研究样本,考察董事会多席位状况与信息披露质量之间的相关性。研究表明:相比无多席位董事的公司,存在多席位董事的公司其信息披露质量更高;繁忙董事会的存在并未削弱上市公司的信息披露质量。董事会多席位状况与信息披露质量的倒U型特征不明显,说明我国董事会多席位状况尚处于二次曲线的递增区间内。Reputation and enough time is essential for the directors to fulfill their obligations as the agents of stockholder.Based on the listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2010,this paper investigated the relationship between multiple directorships and the quality of information disclosure.Empirical results have shown that,compared to the board without multiple directorships,the quality of information disclosure is higher in the board with multiple directorships because the reputation of multiple director is beneficial to the corporate governance;But a busy board with multiple directorships also has a positive effect on the quality of information disclosure.We didn't find the nonlinear characteristic relationship between multiple directorships and the quality of information disclosure,but after calculation,we found that the board of directors with multi-seats in China is still within the range of the increment of the quadratic curve.

关 键 词：董事声誉 繁忙董事会 信息披露质量 多席位董事 董事会治理 公司治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]