生态园区企业环保设备选择的成本分摊博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Cost Allocation Problem for Environment Facility Choice of the Firms in EIPs

作　　者：罗志红[1] 王明超[1] 

机构地区：[1]东华理工大学地质资源经济与管理研究中心,南昌310031

出　　处：《工业安全与环保》2013年第1期87-91,共5页Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection

基　　金：江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目(JJ1244);东华理工大学地质资源经济与管理研究中心开放基金项目(12JJ01)

摘　　要：同时考虑环保设备的购置成本和未治理污染所产生的排污费用,应用合作博弈理论,构造了一个生态园区企业环保设备选择的成本分摊博弈,证明了在环保设备污染治理能力足够大的情况下,该成本分摊博弈具有核非空、次可加性、凹性等性质,并讨论了核、夏普利值等解。最后,通过算例分析验证了研究结论。This paper considers acquisition cost of environment facilities and expenses on untreated pollution simultaneously to construct a cost allocation game of environment facilities choose by using of the cooperative game theory,and it is proved that the cost allocation game has non-empty core,subadditivity and also concave in the condition that environment facilities have large enough abilities to treat pollution.Moreover,core and Shapley value are discussed.Finally,numerical example is given to verify the conclusions presented in this paper.

关 键 词：环保设备 成本分摊 博弈 生态园区 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理] F205[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32