一个证据学上的矛盾--基于逻辑相关性之非品格理论为依据的品格证据禁止规则与概率原理  

An Evidentiary Paradox:Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance,the Doctrine of Chances

作　　者：Edward J.Imwinkelried 王剑虹[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]美国加州大学戴维斯分校法学院 [2]西南政法大学法学院 [3]重庆市人民检察院法律与政策研究室,主任助理重庆400031

出　　处：《南京大学法律评论》2008年第1期180-211,共32页Nanjing University Law Review

摘　　要：品格证据禁止规则是普通法上的一项传统证据法则,过去未经指控的类似错误行为被界定为品格证据而被禁用。不过在司法实践中,法院往往可以根据概率原理对上述行为证据作无关品格的推测从而承认其可采性。尽管近年来也有学者对通过概率原理来采信类似错误行为证据加以批评,但是在尊重品格证据禁止规则的同时,依照概率原理果断采信证明力较高的证据是符合普遍的经验法则的。Character evidence prohibition is a traditional common-law principle and the evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged misconduct,which is regarded as the character evidence,is excluded.But in judicial practice,the court can often admit the mentioned evidence by non-character theory and the doctrine of chances.Although there are some recent attacks on the legitimacy of the doctrine of chances as a non-character theory in recent years,it is necessary to avoid any affront to common sense by admitting vital,probative evidence according to the doctrine of chances while respecting the significant policies promoted by the character evidence prohibition.

关 键 词：品格证据 未经指控的过去错误行为 概率原理 无关品格的理论 

分 类 号：D915.13[政治法律—诉讼法学]