非对称信息下企业治理环境污染的激励机制研究  

Study on the Mechanism of Reducing Environment Pollution for under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：朱天菊[1] 姚平[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南石油大学,四川成都610500 [2]重庆后勤工程学院,重庆401331

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2011年第S1期49-51,共3页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(编号:70871119/G0109);国家社科基金(编号:07XJY026)

摘　　要：基于博弈论构建了隐性声誉激励与显性收益激励相结合的动态激励机制,分析了企业治理环境污染过程中声誉激励因素的激励效应,探讨了非对称信息下隐性声誉激励机制效应发挥的有效均衡条件和相关要求,结果表明,通过引入动态声誉激励机制,不仅能促使企业更加努力进行治污。而且能减少信息不对称或行为不可验证性造成的不利影响。Based on game theory,the dynamic incentive mechanism combined by implicit reputation incentive and explicit revenue incentive was constructed,.analyzing effect of implicit reputation incentive in the process of environmental pollution control,and then the effective equilibrium conditions and requirements of implicit incentive reputation under the asymmetric information condition were studied.It is shown that implicit reputation incentive is a useful complement for explicit revenue incentive.By introducing incentives mechanism,the corporation would be encouraged to make more efforts to control pollution.and reduc the negative impacts caused by information asymmetry or action invalidation.

关 键 词：环境污染 激励机制 博弈论 

分 类 号：X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程]