特许权价值、公司治理和银行稳健性——基于特许权价值和公司治理交互作用的视角  

Franchise Value,Corporate Governance and Bank Stability:Perspective of franchise value and corporate governance interaction

作　　者：曲洪建[1] 孙明贵[2] 张相贤[3,4] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学,上海201620 [2]东华大学,上海200051 [3]北京大学,北京100871 [4]威海商业银行,山东威海264200

出　　处：《财贸研究》2013年第5期120-130,共11页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金项目"特许权价值;公司治理机制和银行稳健性--中美商业银行的比较研究"(12YJC630157);上海工程技术大学高水平培育项目"‘三位一体制度’对银行稳健性的影响研究--中国上市银行的理论与实证研究"(2012pg33);山东省博士后创新项目专项资金资助项目"后危机时代山东省城商行现代风险管理体系再造研究--基于巴塞尔新资本协议ⅱ和ⅲ的视角"(201103017)资助

摘　　要：以2000—2012年沪深股市16家上市银行为样本,实证分析特许权价值、公司治理及其交互作用对银行稳健性的影响。结果表明:特许权价值的自律效应能够提高银行稳健性;第一大股东持股比例和股东性质无法显著影响银行稳健性,而前十大股东的持股比例却显著影响银行稳健性;完善的董事会制度能够提高银行稳健性,而独立董事制度却无法提高银行稳健性;高管持股能够提高银行稳健性,而高管薪酬激励效果则不明显;商业银行存在"大而不倒"的规律,而杠杆效应则不明显;前十大股东的持股比例、高管持股与特许权价值对银行稳健性的影响相互替代。Using a sample of 16 listed banks in 2000-2012,this paper empirically tests how franchise value,corporate governance and their interaction affect bank stability. Franchise value has a significant self-regulatory effect on bank stability. The character and shareholding proportion of the largest shareholder don’t have a significant effect on bank stability,while the top ten shareholders have a significant effect on bank stability. Supervision and management of bank board can improve bank stability,while independent directors don’t play its role in supervision and management. Senior managerial ownership can improve bank stability,while senior managerial salary can’t. There is a positive relationship between bank size and stability. Leverage effect of Chinese listed commercial banks hasn’t been fully used. The franchise value,the top ten shareholders and senior managerial ownership play alternative role on bank stability.

关 键 词：特许权价值 公司治理 银行稳健性 

分 类 号：F7[经济管理—产业经济]