A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider  

作　　者：Li Lei Xin Zhanhong 

机构地区：[1]Beijing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100876, Peoples R China

出　　处：《China Communications》2008年第1期79-83,共5页中国通信（英文版）

摘　　要：Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem.Both conflict and asymmetric information exist between the telecom operators and the service provider, and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider. The relationship between the telecom operators and the service provider is classical multi-task principal-agent relationship. The multi-task incentive for the service provider is considered in the design of the principal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessary to add the. multi-task incentive to the service providers through the analysis of the risk costs and the agency costs of this problem.

关 键 词：SERVICE PROVIDER PRINCIPAL-AGENT analysis ASYMMETRIC information INCENTIVE mechanism 

分 类 号：F623[经济管理—产业经济]