PRINCIPAL-AGENT

作品数:11被引量:20H指数:3
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相关领域:经济管理更多>>
相关作者:王洪静叶梦任曙明芦亮徐升华更多>>
相关机构:大连理工大学江西财经大学更多>>
相关期刊:《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》《Chinese Business Review》《Advances in Manufacturing》更多>>
相关基金:国家自然科学基金国家教育部博士点基金更多>>
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Strategic Contracting for Software Upgrade Outsourcing in Industry 4.0
《Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences》2024年第2期1563-1592,共30页Cheng Wang Zhuowei Zheng 
The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmu...
关键词:Software upgrade outsourcing the principal-agent information asymmetry reverse selection contract design 
Design of Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism between Government and NPO
《Proceedings of Business and Economic Studies》2021年第1期41-45,共5页Honglian Guo Zhenzhen Wu Han Li 
Based on principal-agent theory,this paper establishes an incentive contract mechanism between government and NPO under asymmetric information,and analyzes the impact of absolute risk aversion and output level on the ...
关键词:PRINCIPAL-AGENT Incentive intensity Level of output Expected utility 
Optimal Contract for the Principal-Agent Under Knightian Uncertainty被引量:3
《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》2020年第4期637-654,共18页Kun-Lun Wang Chen Fei Wei-Yin Fei 
This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71571001).
Under the Knightian uncertainty,this paper constructs the optimal principal(he)-agent(she)contract model based on the principal’s expected profit and the agent’s expected utility function by using the sublinear expe...
关键词:Knightian uncertainty PRINCIPAL-AGENT Sublinear expectation HJB equation Behavioral economics 
SCM Implementation Decisions of Principal-Agent under Asymmetric Information
《Open Journal of Applied Sciences》2019年第4期159-171,共13页Lina Wang Stephan Poelmans Koen Milis 
The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-Supply Chain Management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation options’ deci...
关键词:SCM IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS ASYMMETRIC Information IMPLEMENTATION Control COST Evaluation Level PRINCIPAL-AGENT Theory 
Research on China's Public Hospital Governance: From Perspective of Implementation Issues被引量:1
《Chinese Medical Journal》2016年第3期357-360,共4页Yue-Han Yang 
INTRODUCTIONHart once proposed in his book "corporate governance": Some theory and implications that governance issue would emerge if there is any interest conflict between principal and agent with no support of a ...
关键词:GOVERNANCE Power Implementation PRINCIPAL-AGENT Public Hospital 
Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing被引量:12
《Advances in Manufacturing》2014年第2期150-157,共8页Xue-Hua Sun Xue-Jian Chu Zhong-Dai Wu 
In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive sch...
关键词:Inventory financing Asymmetric information PRINCIPAL-AGENT Regulatory incentive 
How to rescue the environment: The uncommon idea
《China-USA Business Review》2009年第9期58-64,共7页Teresa Kwiatkowskd Wojciech Szatzschneider 
Successful solution to any environmental problem implies working with Knightian uncertainty that explicitly deals with decision making under conditions of unstructured randomness. Nature did not endow us with clear se...
关键词:PRINCIPAL-AGENT environment environmental destruction DECISION-MAKING 
The analysis of government procurement in the frame of principal agent theory
《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》2008年第12期58-62,共5页HE Zheng-qiang 
In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the m...
关键词:government procurement PRINCIPAL-AGENT SUPERVISION 
A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider被引量:3
《China Communications》2008年第1期79-83,共5页Li Lei Xin Zhanhong 
Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe servic...
关键词:SERVICE PROVIDER PRINCIPAL-AGENT analysis ASYMMETRIC information INCENTIVE mechanism 
Prevention of the Member's Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Alliance被引量:1
《Chinese Business Review》2003年第5期50-53,共4页Chenglin Liao Kaiqian Wu Xianmu Qiao 
Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. T...
关键词:Dynamic alliance Moral hazard Principal-agent Third-party system 
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