Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing  

作　　者：Xue-Hua Sun Xue-Jian Chu Zhong-Dai Wu 

机构地区：[1]Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mechanical Automation and Robotics,Shanghai University [2]Modern Logistics Research Center,Shanghai University [3]China Shipping Information System Co.,Ltd

出　　处：《Advances in Manufacturing》2014年第2期150-157,共8页先进制造进展（英文版）

摘　　要：In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory.By comparison,it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions,and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions.The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.In inventory financing,asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks,often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem,a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory.By comparison,it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions,and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions.The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

关 键 词：Inventory financing Asymmetric information PRINCIPAL-AGENT Regulatory incentive 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学] F259.23