成本递增的选择性信息披露博弈  

Discretionary Disclosure When Disclosure Cost Increases

作　　者：吴红军[1] 申茂霖 王光铿 汪延鹏 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门大学数学科学学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《生态经济（学术版）》2013年第2期38-41,共4页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71272081);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(11YJA630149)

摘　　要：拓展先前文献中的选择性信息披露模型,提出当信息披露成本为二次函数递增形式时,也存在信息披露均衡,并进一步求得披露的临界水平。当收到的信息质量位于临界水平之上时,企业披露信息获得的利益会超过披露成本,企业披露全部信息,反之企业不会披露信息。文章丰富了关于企业选择性信息披露行为的研究,对信息披露成本的设定比较灵活和贴近现实。The paper sets up a discretionary disclosure model by proposing quadratic cost function of information disclosure. There is equilibrium of disclosure such that traders' conjecture about the content of withheld information is fulfilled by a manager's motivation to withhold the information. When the quality of the information received is above the threshold level,disclosure benefits are more than the costs of disclosure,which lead the corporate discloses all information,otherwise information would be withhold. The paper expands the study about the corporate discretionary disclosure. The model is more flexible and closer to reality.

关 键 词：信息披露成本 选择性披露 披露均衡 披露临界水平 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]