“根据指称决定者为真”的分析性新解及其问题  

The New Interpretation of “true in virtue of meaning”and its Problem

作　　者：叶闯[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学外国哲学研究所,北京100871

出　　处：《河北学刊》2014年第6期14-20,共7页Hebei Academic Journal

基　　金：2012年度教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目<非存在对象的名字与新梅农主义研究>(12JJD720010);国家社会科学基金重点项目<分析哲学若干基本理论问题新探>(12AZD072)

摘　　要：分析性的形而上学解释一直是一个有争议的问题,因为许多人认为此解释依赖于一个会引起严重问题的假设,即从奎因开始就广为流传的双因素决定(语言与世界同时决定)假设。美国哲学家吉利恩·罗素于2008年提出一种以"指称决定者"概念为核心的关于分析性的新定义,企图在修改了的双因素图像下解决这一问题。本文试图表明,罗素的这个新定义并不能真正解决这个问题,因为这种修改既不能被传统双因素解释的拥护者所信服,同时也改变了分析性本来所面向的哲学主题。Metaphysical analyticity has been a controversial concept. Many philosophers reject the concept as unacceptable because it is heavily dependent on the dual factor interpretation of ' true only in virtue of meaning',the interpretation which,they believe,causes notorious difficulties. In 2008 Gillian Russell put forth a new definition of analyticity based on the concept of reference determiners and a revised dual factor interpretation. By the modified version of analyticity she attempts to defend the existence of analyticity without the difficulties of the old version. In the present paper,an argument is developed to show that the new definition cannot solve the difficulties in that the revised dual factor picture gives up,in fact,the fundamental assumptions of any genuine dual factor interpretation and the new definition in terms of the revised dual factor picture makes the suggested concept of analyticity diverge from the philosophical issue that the concept is originally designed to deal with.

关 键 词：意义 真理、分析性、指称决定者 

分 类 号：B081.1[哲学宗教—哲学理论]