高管激励、公司负债与代理成本——基于我国上市公司的实证研究  

Corporate Liabilities,Executive Incentives and Agency Costs──Based on Empirical Study of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：孙亚南[1] 申毅[2] 

机构地区：[1]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226009 [2]南京师范大学商学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《经济经纬》2015年第5期102-107,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：2011年度高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2011SJB630049)

摘　　要：笔者以A股上市公司为研究样本,分析高管激励、公司负债与代理成本的相关性。实证结果发现:在我国,高管激励能有效降低代理成本;而股权激励并不能有效降低代理成本;同时公司负债能够对激励机制起到补充的作用,促使代理成本降低。进一步的研究表明,在不同产权性质和债务期限下,二者对代理成本的影响存在差异:提高负债能有效降低非国有企业在职消费类的代理成本和国有企业的无效率经营类的代理成本;而短期负债能够提高我国上市公司的代理效率。Based on data of A-share listed companies,this paper analyzes the relevance of executive incentive,corporate debt and agency costs. The results show that in our country,salary incentives can effectively reduce agency costs,while share right incentives aren't so effective. And debt can also reduce the agency costs which play a complementary role to the incentives. Meanwhile,further studies show that,under different ownership properties and debt maturities,the effects of executive incentives and corporate debt to agency costs are different: debt can reduce agency costs of company-paid consumption in non-state-owned enterprises and agency costs of inefficient operation in state-owned enterprises. Compared with long-term debt,short-term liabilities can improve agency efficiency.

关 键 词：高管激励 公司负债 代理成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]