资本的泛化与权力博弈  

Extendable Capital and the Game of Power

作　　者：张屹山[1] 王广亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学院,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2004年第7期70-76,共7页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：教育部重大项目(批准号02JAZJD790008)

摘　　要：在资本主义初期,收入相对丰厚的资本被看做是剥削工人的手段,然而现代公司中出资者却又不得不依赖一系列的监督约束措施防止经营者侵占其利益。从理论上说,企业是人力资本和物质资本通过契约方式而组成的经济组织,其内部权利结构依赖于人力资本和货币资本权力博弈的结果。随着人力资本在企业中权力和地位的上升,其地位和收益必然随之提高。事实上,企业收入是两者的共同产出,根本不存在客观的标准划分两者的贡献和应得收入,出资者收入地位的下降并不意味着绝对收入的降低。要素市场上的供给和需求以及不同要素市场之间的对比大致决定了人力资本和物质资本的收益。过分单独强调股东的利益不仅耗费了不必要的成本对剩余进行所谓更“合理”的分配,而且可能扭曲了原本能够最大化企业收益的分配结构。In capitalist initial stage, the capital is regarded as the means to exploit workers, while investors have to take measure to prevent managers from occupying enterprise's benefit in modern company. The purpose of this paper is to find the essence of that phenomenon that investor's income takes a turn for the worse. An enterprise is the economic organization made up through the agreement of manpower capital and material capital in theory. Its property right structure is the result of game between manpower capital and money capital. With the rising of the power of the manpower capital in enterprises, its position and income must be improved thereupon. In fact, there is not an objective standard to divide the contribution and revenue of the two at all, and the decline of investor's status does not mean the reducing of his income. To emphasize interests of shareholder too much not only consume unnecessary cost to adjust so-called 'reasonable' distribution, but also twist the distribution structure that is probably to maximize enterprise's income.

关 键 词：人力资本 企业权利 权力博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]