商业银行:高层经营管理者激励约束机制的动态模型  

Commercial bank:Dynamic Model of Incentive and Control Mechanism for High-level Managers

作　　者：李富国[1] 杨智斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2004年第4期31-35,共5页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：过去公司治理的中心是以货币资本为基础的所有者与经营者关系的界定 ,而目前公司治理的中心则是以货币资本和人力资本共同为基础的两种资本相互关系的界定。主要集中在对人力资本的激励和约束机制的研究上。本文运用动态博弈分析的方法 ,试图构建我国银行高层经营管理者激励约束机制的动态模型。通过确立最优激励因子来激励和约束银行高层经营管理者 ,使之将自身利益与银行长远发展相结合 ,实现银行经营收入最大化。In the past, what the corporate governance focused on was the definition of the relationship between the owner and the operator on the basis of monetary capital, while nowadays on the definition of the correlation between the two kinds of the capital on the basis of both monetary capital and human capital. Using the dynamic game analysis, this paper makes an attempt in building a dynamic model of incentive and control mechanism for high-level managers and points out that by establishing the optimized incentive factors, the high-level managers will combine their own interests and the long-term bank prosperity, thus achieving the maximization of bank return.

关 键 词：商业银行 高层经营管理者 激励机制 约束机制 中国 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]