经理股票期权激励机制异化探析  

Analysis on the Dissimilation of Incentive System of Executive Stock Option

作　　者：张筱峰[1] 刘建江[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济学院,湖南长沙410077

出　　处：《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》2004年第4期76-81,共6页Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：湖南省科技厅科技计划一般项目 (项目编号 0 1JZY2 0 0 7)

摘　　要：美国安然、世通等大公司财务丑闻的爆发 ,使人们对经理股票期权 (ESO)作为一种重要的经理激励机制的有效性产生了怀疑。由于股票期权的滥用、公司治理结构的缺陷、外部监管的不力和法律上的漏洞等因素导致了经理股票期权激励机制的异化 :ESO下经理人报酬对公司股价的过度依赖 ,从而助长了经理人的造假行为、且滋生“合谋”行为 ,以及使公司责任人“虚置”。要解决这些问题 ,需要减轻经理人报酬对公司股价的过份依赖 ,加大造假成本 ,完善会计制度 ,加强审计工作的独立性 ,加强法律监督 ,建立内部约束机制等。Enron and World Com financial scandals make Executive Stock Option(ESO)the target of criticism. Abuse of stock option,defect of the corporate governance,ineffective external supervision and leaks in laws lead to the dissimilation of the incentive system of stock option: Executives' rewards rely on the stock price too much and foster the dishonesty and the conspiracy of executive. In order to perfect the ESO, the mechanism of internal restraint in the firm must be formed, through which the dependence of the executives' reward on the stock price will be weakened. In addition, we must increase the cost of dishonesty, improve the standards of accounting and the independence of the auditing and strengthen law supervision.

关 键 词：经理股票期权 公司治理 异化 舞弊财务报告 

分 类 号：F244.3[经济管理—劳动经济]