均衡稳定性与两种R&D策略的博弈分析  

Equilibrium stability and game analyses on two R&D strategies

作　　者：刘卫民[1] 陈继祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报》2004年第4期472-474,477,共4页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371043)

摘　　要：在AJ模型的基础上,引入R＆D竞争均衡的稳定性分析,通过比较R＆D竞争与联合实验室的均衡策略发现:当竞争均衡对称且稳定时,联合实验室中的企业利润和社会福利水平都较高;而在非对称竞争均衡情况中,评价联合实验室与R＆D竞争的优劣需要更为严格的市场参数条件.Equilibrium stability analysis in R&D competition was introduced into AJ model.Equilibrium comparison between R&D competition and joint laboratory was carried out. as stable and symmetric competition equilibrium exists, the profit and welfare of joint lab are higher. as stable and asymmetric competition equilibrium exit, however, the estimation on joint laboratory R&D competition needs stricter market parameters.

关 键 词：R&D竞争 联合实验室 均衡稳定性 反应函数 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]