转轨经济中国有企业行为及其金融后果  

On the Behavior of SOE and It's Financial Effect in the Transitional Economy

作　　者：肖殿荒[1] 刘旺霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学经济学院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2004年第5期133-137,共5页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金课题 ( 1 9971 0 3 3 )

摘　　要：在转轨经济条件下 ,国有企业行为模式可以概述为全额成本补偿定价行为 ,这就导致了强烈的内在通货膨胀倾向 ,从而伴随着持续的金融风险积累。当政府实施紧缩性政策时 ,国有企业不能实现全额成本补偿 ,其通货膨胀倾向受到抑制 ,但是国有企业却不能充分偿还银行贷款 ,债权银行呆帐曝光。如果放任国有企业的通货膨胀“偏好”,银行和企业的金融困难可以暂时缓解 ,但金融风险将进一步加剧 ,而且又反过来强化通货膨胀倾向。因此这是一个恶性循环 ,应该尽早摆脱 ,根本出路在于充分认识到转轨经济中国有企业特定行为模式及其负面金融后果 ,大大缩小国有经济战线 。In the transitional economy, the behavior pattern of SOEs can be summarized as 'compensating the whole cost', which lead to intensive inflation bias and sustained accumulation of financial risk. Tightening policy will restrain the behavior and bias,and render exposed loan of creditor banks. On the contrary,laissez faire attitude to inflation bias will not only mitigate financial difficulty of SOEs and banks,but also aggravate financial risk and inflation bias. Therefore, there is a vicious circle,which must be broken away from. The only way out is to recognize the behavior pattern of SOEs and its negative financial effects, and draw back the whole state-owned economy into efficacious scale.

关 键 词：国有企业行为模式 全额成本补偿 通货膨胀 金融风险 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]