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出 处:《中国工业经济》2004年第9期65-71,共7页China Industrial Economics
摘 要:股东利益保护是公司治理的核心问题,对中小股东利益的有效保护更是公司制度公平与效率的前提。本文探讨了公司治理结构中市场主导型权力配置机制在保护中小股东利益方面的缺陷,比较分析了异议股东股份价值评估权制度与股东派生诉讼两种主要的中小股东司法救济手段之功效,指出异议股东股份价值评估权制度是一种更为有效的中小股东利益保护手段。最后,就我国公司立法引入该制度进行中小股东利益保护的问题提出了建议。The core issue of corporate governance is the protection of shareholder interest, and the effective protection of minor shareholders interests is furthermore the prerequisite of equity and efficiency for corporate system. This article firstly analyzes the shortcomings of market-oriented right allocation means in protecting minor shareholders' interests, then compares the efficacy of dissenters' appraisal remedy as one major juristic remedy for minor shareholders with that of the derivative action as the other major juristic remedy, and concludes that the dissenters' appraisal remedy is an more effective means to protect minor shareholders' interests. Finally, we give our suggestions about bringing appraisal remedy into Chinese corporate law to protect minor shareholders' interests.
关 键 词:公司治理 中小股东 异议股东股份价值评估权 派生诉讼
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