反洗钱领域大额与可疑信息报告制度的经济学分析  

Economics Analysis of Report System of Large - value and Suspicious Active in Anti - money Laundering

作　　者：杨胜刚[1] 何靖[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《金融研究》2004年第10期113-119,共7页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金规划项目<开放条件下中国反洗钱监管网络问题研究>(批准号:04BJL051)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：从国际上打击洗钱活动的经验来看,反洗钱法律和机制较健全的发达国家和国际反洗钱组织都将大额与可疑信息报告制度作为金融机构反洗钱工作的重点措施之一。本文的目的是要从经济学理论的角度来探讨大额与可疑信息报告制度的必要性与可行性:首先从不对称信息的角度分析大额与可疑信息报告的必要性,然后分析金融机构与反洗钱主管机关在大额和可疑信息报告问题上的博弈关系,最后针对金融机构的理性选择行为提出对策。From the experiences of international organizations and developed countries, the large - value and suspicious activity report is the basic and important work in anti-money laundering. This paper studies the necessity and feasibility of the large - value and suspicious activity report from the perspective of economics. Firstly the paper analyzes the necessity of large - value and suspicious activity report under the incomplete information, then researches the feasibility of large - value and suspicious activity report by a 'game model' between the financial institutions and their supervision in anti - money laundering. Finally some suggestions are proposed for financial institutions on aforementioned model aimed at China's realities.

关 键 词：反洗钱 大额和可疑信息报告制度 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]