小规模分散经营情况下的农产品质量信号问题  

Quality Signaling of Agricultural Products for Small Farmers

作　　者：邹传彪[1] 王秀清[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100094

出　　处：《科技和产业》2004年第8期6-11,共6页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：农产品市场由于信息的不对称,引发了逆向选择和机会主义行为,这是导致食品安全问题的主要原因,在小规模分散经营情况下,这一问题更加严重。本文通过简单的数理模型分析,认为组织的建立能够提高农产品质量,促使质量信号更好的传递,在一定程度上避免了农产品市场上的逆向选择问题。而不同形式的经济组织对于农产品质量信号传递亦产生不同的影响。A market with asymmetric information on product quality induces both adverse selection and opportunistic behavior problems, which is the main reason for food safety problems. But on the condition of small farmer, it becomes more serious. The producer organizations of small farmers will enhance the quality level of agricultural products and impel the quality signaling, which will solve the adverse selection problems on some degree. And different kinds of producer organizations will impose different influence on quality signaling of agricultural products.

关 键 词：分散经营 农产品质量 食品质量 中国 经济组织 

分 类 号：F321.4[经济管理—产业经济]