税企非零和博弈分析  

Analysis of Taxation Bureau and Entrepreneur Non-zero-sum Game

作　　者：刘京娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南税务高等专科学校,湖南长沙410116

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2004年第5期81-85,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：本文以文献[1]和文献[2]为基础,将税收检查成本及偷税成本量化后,对防止偷骗税行为进行非零和博弈分析。具体指出罚款系数的确定方法,为税务决策部门针对偷骗税行为制定合理的罚款系数提供了可操作的理论依据。This paper analyzes non-zero-sum game for preventing tax evasion after the quantitative analysis of the checking cost of taxation bureau and the evading taxes cost of taxpayers on the basis of paper[1] and paper[2]. It gives a definite method of penalty coefficient and contributes workable theoretical grounds to the policy decision departments for defining reasonable penalty coefficient preventing tax evasion.

关 键 词：运筹学 罚款系数 非零和博弈 双矩阵对策 平衡点 检查成本 期望损失 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]