清代山西票号的激励机制及其对当代银行监管的启示  

An analysis of the incentive mechanism of Qin Dynasty's Shanxi Piaohao and how it works in current banking supervision

作　　者：杨兰[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《韩山师范学院学报》2003年第1期27-32,共6页Journal of Hanshan Normal University

摘　　要：票号是 19世纪中国历史上一个重要的金融组织 ,其中 ,最负盛名的是山西票号 ,它在没有政府监管的情况下 ,繁荣昌盛近一个世纪 ,后因战乱不断才逐渐倒闭并消失。山西票号的经营制度深谙委托代理之道 ,也就是今天在经济学界大行其道的激励理论 ,并形成了一套行之有效的激励机制。尽管时代和环境都发生了变化 ,激励问题是永恒的。Piaohao is a kind of very important financial institu tion in Chinese banking history. It was prosperous in the 19 century and had fad ed away during that turbulent times. However its unique and efficient management structure, especially the use of the incentive mechanism and the disposal of th e relation of agent-principal, are still worth learning for the current banking supervision.

关 键 词：委托代理 激励机制 动机监管 

分 类 号：F830.3[经济管理—金融学]