财政考核、制度租金榨取与乡镇债务  

Financial Check, Institutional Rent Squeeze, and Township Governments' Debt

作　　者：谭秋成[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2004年第6期2-13,22,共13页China Rural Survey

摘　　要：在我国 ,乡镇之所以背负沉重债务 ,主要原因是乡镇政府大量投资高风险项目。这种冒险的投资动机源于乡镇政府迎合上级政府的财政考核。乡镇政府希望从自己控制的项目中索取租金 ,以此作为官位晋升或保住职位的赌注。而上级政府设置财政考核这一让乡镇政府铤而走险的机制是为了最大限度地榨取制度租金。乡镇主要负责人由上级政府考察任命 ,乡镇财政收支的基数和范围由上级财政确定。Township Governments heavily fall into debt because they invested too much in highly risky projects. The intention of investing in risky projects originates in township governments' catering to financial check from governments of high-level. The township governments try to seize as much rent as possible in projects in their own control, and take the rent as a stake for official promotion or security of official position. Why does the government of high-level set up the mechanism of financial check that makes the township government risk danger in desperation? It does so for squeezing as much institutional rent as possible. The government of high-level examines and appoints main officials of the township government, determines the amount and scope of the township government's revenue and expenditure. All these lay a base for the government of high-level to control the township government.

关 键 词：租金 乡镇政府 财政 乡镇债务 制度 投资动机 风险项目 上级 主要负责人 官位 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] D630.1[政治法律—政治学]