信息不对称情况下基金管理人的最优激励合同  

Optimal Incentive Contract of Fund Manager under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：张永鹏[1] 陈华[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031 [2]重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《系统工程理论方法应用》2004年第5期443-446,共4页Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications

摘　　要：运用委托-代理的有关理论,提出了3种激励方案,并从投资者的收益出发,比较了3种方案。得出的结论为:将基金的年管理费规定为基金资产净值的2.5%,使投资者的福利有所损失;同时,对基金管理人的激励也欠佳。随着我国加入WTO,竞争的加剧,应尽快地下调基金管理费,实现基金管理费的市场化,对于投资者的收益或对于基金管理人的激励都是有利的。This paper employs the relevant theory about principal-agent, proposing three incentive schemes, and also compares these schemes based on the benefit of investors. The conclusion is that when the annual management fee is regulated into 2.5% of the net asset value, it will lose the loss of investors benefit; at the same time, the incentive effect of fund manager is not good. With our entry to WTO, and the intension of competition, the annual management fee should be reduced. The annual management fee of the fund should be geared to market as soon as possible. All this can benefit the profit of investors and incentive of fund manager.

关 键 词：委托-代理 信息不对称 激励合同 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]