科技投入的博弈分析模型  

The Analysis Model of Game Theory for Scientific and Technological Investment

作　　者：王来生[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学,北京100083

出　　处：《数理统计与管理》2005年第1期109-111,共3页Journal of Applied Statistics and Management

摘　　要：本文把博弈论应用于科技投入分析,利用博弈论的委托—代理理论构造了一个委托—代理激励模型,研究中央对地方科技投入的激励机制,并针对委托人和代理人的不同风险情况进行了分析,讨论了对地地方政府科技投入激励的必要性。Game Theory is applied to scientific and technological in vestment in this paper,and using the theory of principal-agent sets up a principal-agent incentive model. An incentive mechanism which the central government supports the local government on scientific and technological investment is studied. The risksof principal and agent are analyzed respectively and the necessary of the incentive mechanism is discussed.

关 键 词：博弈论 期望效用 激励机制 

分 类 号：O212[理学—概率论与数理统计] C8[理学—数学]