论邦久的确证的内在主义  

On Laurence Bonjour's Internalism of Justification

作　　者：陈英涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第1期88-94,共7页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(02BZX042)

摘　　要：重建知识论是邦久哲学的终极命意,而如何理解确证的本质是重建知识论的关键所在。邦久的确证理论经历了前期和后期截然不同的重大变化,在批判基础主义与外在主义的基础上,前期的邦久形成了有着重大影响的内在主义的一致主义,但由于内在主义的一致主义逐渐显露出严重的理论困难,邦久最终放弃了这一理论,重新回到了内在主义的基础主义之路上来。Re-constructing epistemology is the ultimate concern of Bonjour's philosophy. But how to understand the essence of justification is the key to the re-construction of epistemology. Bonjour's theory of justification goes through great changes from his early to later years. On the basis of criticizing foundationalism and externalism in his early years, Bonjour forms his internalist coherentism, which has great influence on contemporary epistemology. Due to the theoretical difficulty of internalist coherentism unfolded by many epistemologists, Bonjour ultimately gives up this theory and goes back to internalist foundationalism.

关 键 词：确证 邦久 内在主义 一致主义 基础主义 

分 类 号：B712.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]