防范保险代理人风险的激励与约束机制  

Take Precautions against The Incentive and Tied Mechanism of Insurance Agent's Risk

作　　者：王焕英[1] 吴广彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]德州学院政法系,山东德州253023 [2]黑龙江省社科院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《德州学院学报》2005年第1期18-21,共4页Journal of Dezhou University

摘　　要：本文根据现代信息经济学理论,在对保险代理人风险的特征进行分析的基础上,针对目前我国保险人与代理人之间存在的激励机制失效、约束机制弱化的问题,运用隐性激励机制和加强对代理人管理等刚性的约束机制,防范保险代理人风险。By modern information economics theory and the foundation of analyzing the characteristics of insurance agent's risk, explanative the question of loses efficiency and the tied mechanism weaken between the insurer and agent. Utilize the implicit incentive mechanism and the tied mechanisms of rigidity to take precautions against the agent's risk.

关 键 词：代理人 风险 激励机制 约束机制 

分 类 号：F840.32[经济管理—保险]