企业合并:政府主导下的多方利益博弈——来自10起换股合并案例的检验  

Enterprise Merger:the Multipartite Games for Benefits Led by the Government

作　　者：谭劲松[1] 刘炳奇[1] 谭燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理世界》2005年第2期118-132,共15页Journal of Management World

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(批准号:02CJY006);教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划项目(批准号:01JA790101)成果之一

摘　　要：本文意在通过分析1998年以后发生在我国证券市场的10起换股合并案例的存续企业合并后的经济效果,对企业合并动机进行动态研究,以检验前期静态研究的结论,寻求我国企业合并的真正动因。结果显示,10起合并案例的经济效果并不明显。结合对股东财富效应的分析和有关制度背景以及政府行为的讨论,可以认为:追求经济效率只是合并各方宣称的合并目的,而政府主导下的多方利益博弈才是企业合并的真正动因。By an analysis of the economic effect of the existing after-merger enterpr ises subsequent to the ten cases of exchange of stocks which have arisen in Chin a's securities market since 1998, we in this paper have made a dynamic study of the motive of enterprise mergers to examine the conclusion derived by the static study made before and to seek the genuine reasons for the merger of enterprises in China. Our study indicates that the economic effect of the ten after-merger enterprises is not noticeable. Through the combined discussions on the analysis of shareholders'income effect, the relevant background of system and the governm ental behavior, we believe that seeking after economic efficiency is but the pur pose claimed by the parties concerned in the merger, while the bona fide motivat ion is the multipartite games for benefits with the government playing the leadi ng role.

关 键 词：企业合并 换股合并 政府主导 存续企业 股东财富 我国企业 动因 利益博弈 案例 制度背景 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]