Supply Chain Coordination with Sales Effort Effects and Impact of Loss Aversion on Effort Decision  

作　　者：索寒生 王京春 金以慧 

机构地区：[1]Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

出　　处：《Tsinghua Science and Technology》2005年第1期102-107,共6页清华大学学报（自然科学版（英文版）

基　　金：Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No. 60174046)

摘　　要：A new supply contract based on sharing the sales profits as well as the cost of effort was devel- oped to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort effects. The contract coordinates the supplier’s actions with voluntary compliance; the contract is symmetric in the sense that both the supplier’s and retailer’s prof- its are linearly correlated and is more easily implemented in some situations. The impact of the retailer’s loss aversion on his effort is investigated based on the contract. After characterizing the retailer’s optimal solutions, this paper demonstrates that contrary to intuition, loss aversion weakens incentives for retailer’s sales effort and the retailer’s optimal effort decreases as the loss aversion increases.A new supply contract based on sharing the sales profits as well as the cost of effort was devel- oped to coordinate the supply chain with sales effort effects. The contract coordinates the supplier’s actions with voluntary compliance; the contract is symmetric in the sense that both the supplier’s and retailer’s prof- its are linearly correlated and is more easily implemented in some situations. The impact of the retailer’s loss aversion on his effort is investigated based on the contract. After characterizing the retailer’s optimal solutions, this paper demonstrates that contrary to intuition, loss aversion weakens incentives for retailer’s sales effort and the retailer’s optimal effort decreases as the loss aversion increases.

关 键 词：supply chain coordination sales effort loss aversion 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F713.50[经济管理—国民经济]