论“高薪养廉”  

作　　者：谢明[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学公共管理学院,北京100872

出　　处：《投资与建设》2002年第3期14-19,共6页

基　　金：天则研究所<政治体制改革>研究项目课题

摘　　要：本文以经济人假设为立论前提 ,分析低薪为什么易导致腐败 ,并在此基础上提出“高薪养廉”的政策主张。文中着重介绍了我国清代的“养廉银”和“养廉地”制度以及香港和新加坡的反腐败经验 ,分析了高薪养廉与监督制裁的关系 ,探讨了高薪养廉如何实施的具体问题并设计了一些具有可操作性的的执行办法。文章的结论是 :高薪固然重要 ,但只是养廉的必要条件而非充分条件 ;它必须与监督机制和惩治机制相结合 ,共同创造一个良性的制度环境 。Based on a hypothesis about economic persons, this paper analyses the reason of low salary's tendency to result in corruption, and proposes the policy of 'offering high salary to keep incorruptness'. The paper centers on introducing the regulations of'taels for keeping incorruptness' and 'land for keeping incorruptness' in Chinese Qing dynasty and the anti-corruption experience of Hong Kong and Singapore. Meanwhile, it makes an analysis of the relationship between this policy and the supervision system, and explores the implementation issues, some feasible means being designed. Finally, the paper reaches the conclusion that, important as it is, high salary is only a prerequisite but not sufficient condition. It has to be combined with supervision and punishment institutions to create a favorable environment so that corruption could be reduced effectively.

关 键 词：高薪养廉 制度环境 经济人假设 政策主张 香港 监督机制 新加坡 结论 具体问题 立论 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] G633[经济管理—国民经济]