利润分享机制下经理行动组合的探讨  

Study A Manager's Behavior Combination under Mechanism of Profits Share Incentive

作　　者：张勇[1] 吴传文[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南科技大学管理学院,四川绵阳621002

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2005年第1期10-13,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

摘　　要：本文对提高经理工作努力和减少经理机会主义行为的问题进行了探讨。首先,认为经理不但有机会主义行为的动机而且还有实施机会主义行为的条件,因此,认为经理机会主义行为的发生是完全可能的。然后,把问题模型化并进行了分析。通过分析指出:简单委托—代理模型分析得到的利润分享系数偏低。提高利润的分享系数不但会增加经理的工作努力而且能够抑制经理的机会主义行为。在契约生效后,所有者还可以用一些方法来提高经理的工作努力或者抑制经理的机会主义行为。In this paper, we study a problem how to improve a manager work hard and induce his opportunism behavior. Firstly,we think the manager not only have motive of opportunism behavior but also have conditions that put motive into practice. Therefore, we think occur opportunism behavior in a corporate is completely possible.Then, we model the problem and analysis this problem through using the model. Through anaiyses we point out:the coefficient of share profits in brief principal-agency model is lower.The proprietor improves share profits coefficients of the manager to corporate that the manager's work hard can be increase and opportunism behavior can be repress. After the contract put into practice, the proprietor can use some methods to improve the manager's hard and repress opportunism behavior.

关 键 词：信息经济学 行动组合 多任务委托代理模型 机会主义行为 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]