基于供应链缺货的VMI激励机制研究  

Mechanism of VMI Incentive Based on Stock out in Supply Chains

作　　者：刘志学[1] 储力[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《管理学报》2005年第2期180-183,共4页Chinese Journal of Management

摘　　要：基于 VMI的供应链伙伴之间是一种委托 -代理关系。在委托代理过程中 ,由于双方目标不一致会引起一系列风险 ,因而委托方需要建立对代理方的激励机制以促使双赢。为此探讨在基于供应商和分销商的 VMI系统下 ,分销商缺货时 ,作为核心企业的供应商如何对分销商进行激励 ,通过建立信息对称和不对称两种情况下的激励模型并进行求解比较 。Partners under vendor managed inventory(VMI) in a supply chain act as principal and agent. When the principal-agent approach was carried out, both parties may have their own targets causing diversified risks, and the principal should stimulate his agent to have a win-win cooperation. This paper examined how the supplier gave his incentives to minimize loss in a VMI system with a supplier and a distributor when being out of stock. The author also constructed incentive models to help the supplier make an effective contract under following two situations, namely, whether the supplier can or not observe the distributor's effort.

关 键 词：供应商管理库存 委托代理机制 VMI激励机制 供应链缺货现象 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]