考试监考的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Invigilation in Examination

作　　者：张琼[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学中南分校,湖北武汉430223

出　　处：《武汉科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2005年第1期89-91,共3页Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：针对高校考试中学生舞弊现象较常见这一问题,建立了监考博弈模型,该博弈不存在纯战略纳什均衡,只存在混合战略纳什均衡。分析表明,学校严格执行监考制度是非常必要的。同时指出,必须在全社会进行诚信建设以扼制考试舞弊之风。Cheating in examination is very common in colleges and universities.This paper has established the game model of invigilation.It is found that the game of invigilation is characterized by mixed strategic Nash equilibrium rather than pure strategic Nash equilibrium.It is pointed out that strict invigilation is necessary and credibility must be upheld.

关 键 词：考试 监考制度 舞弊现象 博弈分析 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：G424.74[文化科学—课程与教学论]