制造商为核心企业的三级供应链套牢问题研究  

Study on Hold-up Problem in Three Tier Supply Chain Coordinated by Manufacture

作　　者：陈祥国[1] 季建华[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报》2005年第4期95-98,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology

基　　金：家自然科学基金 (70 4 72 0 5 7)

摘　　要：以解决制造商为核心企业的供应链套牢问题为出发点,给出了由制造商协调的供应链这种特定结构供应链的套牢问题合约解。在假定制造商拥有所有讨价还价的权力的条件下,从对最优产量的激励和对在最优产量下最优投资的激励2个方面得出了激励条件。因此。The hold-up problem in supply chain that coordinated by the manufacture was solved. On the assumption that all bargaining power was possessed by manufacture, two incentive conditions (the transfer prices) were concluded: the incentive condition of the first-best production quantity and the incentive condition of the first-best investment under the first-best production quantity. The conclusion also verified that an incomplete contract could solve the hold-up problem in supply chain that coordinated by manufacture.

关 键 词：供应链 套牢问题 合约设计 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]