康德哲学与广松涉“交互主体的共同主观性”理论  

Kantian Philosophy and Hiromatsu's Theory of "Common Subjecdveness of Intersubjectivity"

作　　者：杨思基[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学哲学系

出　　处：《现代哲学》2005年第2期25-31,共7页Modern Philosophy

摘　　要：广松涉认为,对近代认识论基础的问题式及其构成机制和局限进行反思,首先需要将着眼点放在康德哲学的问题式及其构成机制上。康德哲学的总的问题式就是在以先验逻辑学为基础的逻辑学、认识论和本体论“三位一体”的哲学构架中,探讨人的认识以及纯粹理性的先天综合判断及其能力何以可能。这一问题式潜含着一个意义非常重大的认识论问题——即“主体际共同主观性”问题,需要我们认真地加以研究。Hiromatsu believes that in order to reflect on the question formula, which is based on the contemporary epistemology, and its construction mechanism and limitations we first of all need to place our starting point on Kant Philosophy's question formula and its construction mechanism. The general question formula of Kant's philosophy is based on the philosophic ' trinity' of logics, which is based on transcendental logics, epistemology and ontology. Based on this frame, this question formula tries to explore the possibilities of epistemology and the innate synthetic judgment and capability of the pure reason. Underlying this question formula is a quite significant epistemological issue, which is: intersubjectivity's common subjectivity, which calls for attentive study.

关 键 词：认识论 先验的主观形式 先验逻辑学 主体际共同主观性 主观物象 

分 类 号：B313.7[哲学宗教—外国哲学]