论企业财权配置——基于公司治理理论发展视角  

Probe into Financial-right disposing of the Enterprise

作　　者：张栋[1] 杨淑娥[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,710049

出　　处：《会计研究》2005年第4期56-59,95,共5页Accounting Research

摘　　要：传统的公司治理的委托代理理论框架下的“股东主权”治理论认为物质资本投入者应独享企业剩余索取权与剩余控制权, 关注的是股东利益保护。在该理论影响下, 公司财务治理也主要关注的是股东和经营者的企业内部财权配置, 以解决委托人如何选择或设计最优合同来克服代理问题。本文认为随着公司治理理论由委托代理理论向利益相关者共同治理理论的发展, 现代企业的每一个利益相关者都应有平等机会享有企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权, 企业的财权配置不仅仅是股东和经营者的企业内部财权配置, 而应扩展到包括外部利益相关者在内的外部财权配置, 以及为保证利益相关者财权配置实现的相机治理机制。Financial-right disposing is the core of enterprise ownership. The traditional theory of “Shareholder-Primacy”thinks that the companies'financial value leads to the shareholder, what company pursue is maximizing shareholders'wealth, and the financial-rights disposing should be internal financial-right disposing of enterprise between shareholders and managers. With the theory of stakeholders springing up, this paper thinks that the financial value of modern company should face all stakeholders, its operation objective is to maximize each stakeholders benefit. The financial-right disposing should be not only internal disposition of enterprise and should expand to include external disposition, as well as the homologous governance mechanism of guaranteeing the financial-right disposing to realize.

关 键 词：财权配置 理论发展 企业剩余索取权 利益相关者 剩余控制权 视角 “股东主权” 股东利益保护 公司财务治理 委托代理理论 公司治理理论 相机治理机制 企业内部 资本投入 理论框架 代理问题 现代企业 经营者 委托人 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] A849[经济管理—国民经济]