公司治理中代理问题的新动向  

New Tendency of the Problem of Agency in the Corporate Governance

作　　者：李海鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2005年第5期78-79,共2页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：纵观企业的发展史,可以看出,随着公司制企业的产生,所有权与经营权开始分离,公司治理与代理问题也随之产生。随着时间的推移,当股权结构由分散趋于集中时,公司治理中代理问题正由外部股东与内部管理者之间的委托代理向控股股东与小股东之间的委托代理转化。Making a general survey of the development history of enterprises, you can find out ,as the corporation births, power of management separates from ownership, the corporate governance and the problem of agency follow.Over time,the stock right structure is becoming more and more centralized from disperse.The problem of agency is transforming from Principal-Agency between outside shareholder and inside administrator to it between holding shareholder and minority stock holder.

关 键 词：公司治理 代理成本 双层委托代理 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]