不甘落后劳动者模型  

Non-Lagged Worker: A Model of Economic Explain about a Wage Compact

作　　者：武永胜[1] 刘玲玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古工业大学管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010062 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《财经研究》2005年第6期52-59,共8页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：文章开始介绍了实际中观察到的两份工资合同:A 合同低底薪,然后按比例提成;B 合同高底薪,但要求达到一定的产出额度,超出按比例提成,不足按相同比例扣减。由于简单的参数模型不足以解释这两份合同的差别,作者运用委托代理的思想设计了不甘落后的劳动者模型,此模型的假设是,不甘落后的劳动者,依据薪酬周期的前半部分的努力水平,调整在后半部分中的努力水平。在这里作者引入了不甘落后系数,这样模型很好地解释了上述两份合同的差别。并且得出随着不甘落后系数的增大,代理人分享产出的比例逐步减小,总代理成本逐步减小。此模型随后还得出最优合同设置的必要条件。This paper begins with two pieces of wage compact. One is low base pay with a percentage deduction from the sum of total optput,while the other is high base pay, but a ration of the work should be finished. If he exceeds the ration, he deducts a percentage from the excess. If he falls short of the ration, he loses the same percentage from the deficiency. Because the simple HM model(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) is deficient in explaining the differences between these two compacts, I build MAAS (the model of acquiring achievementsense) by using principleagent model, which well explains the differences between these two compacts, And I induce that the share proportion of deputy in output and the total cost of agent will decrease as AAS (acquiring achievementsense) coefficient increase. At the same time, the utility function of acquiring achievementsense is a multiple criterion utility function, which indicates that not only income is important to labor, but also fulfilling his achievement motivation.

关 键 词：不对称信息 委托代理 不甘落后系数 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]