公司治理结构与股利分配动机——基于代理成本和利益侵占的分析  

Corporate Governance and Payout Incentive-based on Agency Cost and Tunneling

作　　者：吕长江[1] 周县华[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2005年第3期9-17,共9页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70272005);中国会计学会重点项目(2003KJA011)的资助

摘　　要：本文以我国上市公司为对象,从公司治理结构安排的角度,系统研究2001年管理层出台新政策后公司的股利分配动机。结果表明,降低代理成本假说和利益侵占假说都在不同程度地发挥作用,集团控股公司适合降低代理成本假说;而对于政府控制公司,用利益侵占假说解释其股利分配动机更为恰当。我们进一步发现,针对我国特殊的股权结构特征及流通特征,现金股利在中国资本市场中具有“双刃剑”特征。How to analyze and estimate the motivation and behavior of corporate payout policy based on different background will be very important for the decisions of government and firm policy. This paper takes listed companies as sample, to study corporate payout behavior after issuing of new regulations on dividend from the views of cor- porate governance. Our results indicate agency cost hypothesis and tunneling hypothesis coexist in listed companies, Group controlled companies suitable to agency cost hypothesis, and tunneling hypoth- esis can explain the incentive of Government controlled companies. We also find that cash dividend possess the characteristic of double- eclged sword in special Chinese corporate ownership structure and stock trading environment.

关 键 词：代理成本 股利分配 公司治理结构 侵占 利益 动机 集团控股公司 中国资本市场 2001年 上市公司 结构安排 系统研究 发挥作用 政府控制 现金股利 结构特征 假说 新政策 管理层 双刃剑 出台 流通 股权 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]