合作知识创新中基于Stackelberg博弈的资源共享决策模型  

Resource Sharing Decision Model Based on Stackelberg Game in Collaborative Knowledge Creations

作　　者：王建宇[1] 樊治平[1] 姜艳萍[1] 胡国东[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2005年第3期84-88,共5页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371050;70301008);教育部高等学校优秀青年教师教学科研奖励计划资助项目 (教人司 [2 0 0 2 ]1 2 3 );教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目 (2 0 0 40 1 450 1 8);辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目 (2 0 0 3 2 0 2 8);辽宁省博士启动基金资助项目 (2 0 0 41 0 1 9)

摘　　要：在跨组织的合作知识创新中,如何合理地分配和共享资源至关重要。本文研究了合作知识创新中的跨组织资源共享及合作维系的条件,采用博弈论方法,把合作知识创新看作是一个领导组织和多个从属组织的Stackel berg主从博弈决策模型,领导组织作为主方给出最优参与率策略,各跟随组织作为从方以总体投入以及参与率策略响应,求出了知识创新投入的均衡值、领导组织的参与、各跟随者的参与率以及创新的总体期望收益。文中指出,只有领导组织的边际收益和各从属组织边际收益之和保持最优比,合作才可能形成并有效维系。<Abstrcat> For any collaborative endeavor to succeed,adequate allocation and sharing of resources are important in inter-organizational collaborative knowledge creation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the condition for resource sharing and maintaining collaboration in inter-organizational collaborative knowledgecreation. Firstly,using the game theoretic framework,the collaboration for knowledge creation is modeled as a Stackelberg leader-follower game with one leader and multi-follower. In this model,decisions are made at two stages. In the first stage,the leader sets the level of its involvement,which is called the participation rate,and in the next stage,the follower reacts to the leaders' decision by setting an optimal value for the total efforts and respective participation rate. The equilibrium values of current efforts in knowledge creation,the leader and followers' resource participation rate,and the total expected gain were then determined. Finally,it's pointed out that maintaining an optimal ratio between the leader's and followers' marginal gains is important for the formation and continuation of the collaboration.

关 键 词：STACKELBERG 知识创新 决策模型 资源共享 合作 共享资源 组织 领导 博弈论 收益 从属 投入 总体 均衡 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] O225[经济管理—国民经济]