论不完全信息下公共产品的自愿供给效率  

REMARK ON THE SELF-SUPPLY EFFICIENCY OF COMMON COMMODITY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

作　　者：危启才[1] 李楚霖[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学数学系

出　　处：《经济数学》2005年第2期136-143,共8页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(项目批准号:70301003)

摘　　要：本文着重研究了不完全信息下公共产品的自愿供给效率.通过建立一个较以往更为一般的贝叶斯博弈模型,将影响公共产品自愿供给效率的各种因素纳入所建模型中,系统深入地剖析了不完全信息下公共产品的自愿供给效率总是显得更为低下的结论.In this paper, we mainly researched the self supply efficiency of common commodity under incomplete information. First, via building a more general Bayesian game model about the self-supply of common commodity than before and introducing a variety of factors that may affect to the self-supply efficieny of common commodity to which.we analyzed systematically the affects from the factors of the model to the self-supply efficiency of common commodity under incomplete information. Second,we proved that the selfsupply effciency of common commodity is much lower under incomplete information than under complete formation.

关 键 词：不完全信息 公共产品 供给效率 供给 博弈模型 贝叶斯 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F812.2[经济管理—国民经济]