企业隐性知识外部化过程中企业与员工的博弈分析  

A Game between Enterprises and Employees in the Externalization of Tacit Knowledge

作　　者：司训练[1] 陈金贤[1] 李秉祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理工程与科学学院,陕西西安710047

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2005年第9期77-81,共5页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：陕西省教育厅自然科学研究基金项目(04JK262);陕西省自然科学研究基金项目(2004G06)

摘　　要：企业构建核心竞争力的基础条件需要将企业内部隐性知识外部化,这一过程中存在着企业与员工的相互博弈。据此提出一个动态重复博弈模型,分析了企业与员工在隐性知识显性化进程中的博弈过程,探讨了企业与员工最佳博弈策略的选择.最后提出了基于博弈结果的政策设计原则。One of the primary requirements for an enterprise establishing its core competence is the externalization of tacit knowledge within the enterprise. A game between an enterprise and its employees exists in this process. By means of a dynamic overlap game model, this article firstly analyzes the game process between enterprise and employee in encoding tacit knowledge （TK） of employee, then studies the selection of optimal game strategy of enterprises and their employees. Finally, a game-based policy design principle for the enterprises is presented.

关 键 词：隐性知识 外部化 动态博弈 均衡价格 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]