信号显示博弈与国际寡头最优进入策略的选择  

The Signal Revealing Game and the Choice of the Optimal Entry Strategy of International Oligo

作　　者：姚洪心[1] 刘存绪[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610066

出　　处：《财经研究》2005年第10期5-13,共9页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：在信息不完全的国际市场竞争中,寡头企业可以通过观察竞争者不同市场进入策略带来的收益为信号帮助判断其真实的成本类型。文章以FDI和出口贸易作为信号推证了在成本类型不确定条件下混同均衡和分离均衡存在的条件;文章的推论表明如果分离均衡条件满足,双边企业可以获得完全信息条件下的均衡产出,如果混同均衡条件满足,双方则将按照不完全信息博弈规则选择古诺纳什产出。In the international competiton under incomplete imformation, the oligopolistic firm can treat the revenues of the competitors as a signal to judge their true cost types through observing their different market entry stategies. In this paper, we take the FDI and export as signals to deduce the conditions of pooling equilibrium and separate equilibrium under the uncertainty of the cost type, and the propositons infer that as the condition of the separate equilibrium is binding, bilateral firm can hold tile equilibrium output under the complete information, furthermore, as the condition of the pooling equilibrium is binding, both firms choose the Cournot-Nash output according to game rules under incomplete information.

关 键 词：外国直接投资 出口贸易 信号博弈 分离均衡 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]