维特根斯坦论有意义的怀疑——《论确定性》的怀疑观管窥  

Wittgenstein's Discourse on Meaningful Doubt——The Skeptical Idea in On Certainty

作　　者：曹剑波[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,厦门361005

出　　处：《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第5期103-110,共8页Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(02BZX042)。

摘　　要：《论确定性》是维特根斯坦晚年最重要的哲学著作,包含丰富的怀疑思想。维特根斯坦认为,怀疑主义的怀疑缺乏合理怀疑的根据,远离日常语言游戏的范围,建立不起怀疑与人的活动的联系,而且完全忽视、否定了怀疑中隐含的肯定的、不受怀疑的因素,因此不是真正的怀疑,是无意义的。维特根斯坦的怀疑思想是以实践的基础主义为理论基础。On Certainty, as the most important work of Wittgenstein's late years, includes abundant thought of doubt. In it he holds that skeptical doubt is neith er genuine nor meaningful, for it is short of a foundation of reasonable doubt and far away from the ordinary language game. It cannot build up relations of doubt and human activities, and completely overlooks and even denies those positive and unsuspecting elements of reasonable doubt. Wittgenstein's idea of doubt is theoretically based on practical foundationalism.

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 有意义的怀疑 怀疑主义 《论确定性》 实践的基础主义 

分 类 号：B521[哲学宗教—外国哲学]